Field experiments in the area of tax compliance are rare. This field experiment generates a unique data set with respect to individuals' under-declaration of income and wealth and over-deductions of tax credits by obtaining exclusive full access to the audits. Using this commune level data from Switzerland, the paper explores the influence of moral suasion on tax compliance. Moral suasion was introduced through a treatment in which taxpayers received a letter signed by the commune's fiscal commissioner containing normative appeals. Interestingly, I observe differences between under-declaration and over-deductions. Moreover, the overall finding is in line with former results that moral suasion has hardly any effect on taxpayers' compliance. compliance.
D D D i i i s s s c c c u u u s s s s s s i i i o
o o n n n P P P a a a p p p e e e r r r a a a n n n d d d W W W o o o r r r k k k i i i n n n g g g P P P a a a p p p e e e r r r S S S e e e r r r i i i e e e s s s
A Field Experiment on Moral Suasion and Tax Compliance Focusing on Under-Declaration and Over-Deduction

Benno Torgler
Working/Discussion Paper # 285
June 2012 Abstract:
Field experiments in the area of tax compliance are rare. This field experiment generates a unique data set with respect to individuals' under-declaration of income and wealth and over-deductions of tax credits by obtaining exclusive full access to the audits. Using this commune level data from Switzerland, the paper explores the influence of moral suasion on tax compliance. Moral suasion was introduced through a treatment in which taxpayers received a letter signed by the commune's fiscal commissioner containing normative appeals. Interestingly, I observe differences between under-declaration and over-deductions. Moreover, the overall finding is in line with former results that moral suasion has hardly any effect on taxpayers' compliance.
A Field Experiment on Moral Suasion and Tax Compliance
Focusing on Under-Declaration and Over-Deduction Results indicate that moral suasion has hardly any effect on taxpayers' compliance behaviour. The current paper complements this previous study and offers a unique opportunity to explore individuals' under-declaration of income and wealth and overdeduction of tax credits. As mentioned previously, unlike previous tax compliance studies and field experiments, I have full access to the audits.
II. FIELD EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was conducted in the commune ( 4) Unfortunately, field experiments in the area of tax compliance are limited due to the fact that the law heavily restricts the ability to test questions on topics such as tax rates or deterrence. However, the exploration of (soft) factors such as moral suasion or the provision of rewards for compliance (Feld, Frey and Torgler, 2006) are achievable.
The experimental treatment group received a letter immediately after a taxpayer received the tax form. The letter and its translation are shown in the Appendix. The letter was developed in concordance with the three phases in the processing of a persuasive message, namely attention, comprehension and acceptance of the message content (Hovland, 1959) . The treatment group received a letter signed by the commune fiscal commissioner in February 2002. The letter was sent separately just after the 2001 tax form to increase the probability that taxpayers using professional assistance would read the letter. We chose to print on pink paper to attract attention. The style of letter (easy to read and to comprehend) and an adequate length (not too long) were selected in order to capture the attention and acceptance of taxpayers.
The available statistics confirm that both groups were very similar to each other before the experimental treatment (year 2000). For example, the mean taxable income was 44,761 Swiss Francs (CHF) for the control group and 44,427 for the treatment group, and the distribution appears to be very similar (see Figure The selection of a small town such as Trimbach is discussed intensively in Torgler (2004) . Here I should note that a strong interaction at the local level (as is the case in Trimbach) can promote cooperation (Torgler, Schneider & Schaltegger, 2010 inspected all tax forms rather than randomly picking some tax forms to be audited.
Reporting of the results begins with an observation of differences in the mean between the groups. The control group returns a value of 1,525 CHF while the treatment group reports over-compliance . However, a two-sample t-test shows no statistically significant difference between the two groups. In 44% of cases the tax administration did not correct the total income earned in the treatment group, while the control group had no changes in 46% of the cases. In 15% of the cases, people reported too much income in the treatment group while in the control group 14% over-reported. Thus, it seems that moral suasion had a small positive (though not statistically significant) effect on tax compliance. However, the picture changes when considering total deductions. As a proxy for tax evasion through over-deduction I use:
total deduction reported by the taxpayer -total deductions reported by the tax administration. Thus, positive values indicate that taxpayers have reported higher deductions than actually allowed. The control group returns a positive mean value of 816 CHF, while the treatment group reports an even higher mean value (namely 1351 CHF). Again, the difference is not statistically significant. In 31% (35%) of the cases no changes were made to the tax return by the tax administration in the treatment group (control group). On the other hand, in 55% (53%) of the cases, taxpayers claimed higher deductions than they were allowed. However, in most of the cases (more than 50%) the amounts of over-deductions were less than 10,000 CHF for both groups. Key potential deductions are provided in the section on professional expenses. Having obtained a large set of additional variables (based on the tax form) from the tax administration I apply a multivariate analysis. It is clear from the results (presented in Table 1 ) that the treatment dummy is never statistically significant. In general, the results should be treated with caution as the R-squared values are very low. Interestingly, one observes a U-shape for the relationship between age and overdeductions relationship a reverse relationship for under-declaration of wealth. It is also worth mentioning that when analysing wealth, Protestants and Catholics have a higher level of tax compliance than other denominations and people without a denomination. Looking at the same dependent variable I observe that homeowners are 8 also more compliant. Taxable income is only relevant when considering overdeductions, and in this case it returns a negative coefficient. Interestingly, tax declarations made on a computer are more likely to report over-deductions and underdeclaration of wealth. In line with Blumenthal et al. (2001) I also explored the interaction between moral suasion and variables such as income, self-employment (greater opportunity costs), and home-owners (more permanent/long term connection to their immediate community). In most cases the interaction term was not statistically significant. It is only for income tax evasion that I observe home-owners are more receptive to moral suasion than other taxpayers, with a t-value on the border of statistical significance (tvalue 1.65).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Referring to Angrist and Pischke's (2010) 
article entitled The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Designs Is Taking the Con out of
Econometrics, Slemrod and Weber (2012) raise the criticism that "with regard to the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy, the credibility revolution has, for the most part, not yet arrived. The late arrival of the credibility revolution is not because of inattention by creative empirical researchers. Rather, it is because severe measurement problems plague empirical analysis in this context, problems that arise not by chance, but because of the nature of the subject matter" (p. 50). Field experiments offer an opportunity to promote the credibility revolution in the study of tax evasion. They have the advantage of being broadly generalizable in a best-case scenario where individuals do not make a choice whether or not to participate, and by "combining randomization and realism in this manner, natural field experiments provide a different parameter estimate than do laboratory, artefactual, and framed field experiments" (List 2011, p. 6) . The treatments in this study were implemented by the tax authority which evokes real processes allowing us to observe taxpayers' behaviour in their usual environment outside the laboratory setting (Torgler, 2004) .
The strength of our field experiment compared to those by authors such as Blumenthal et al. 2001 or Slemrod, Blumenthal, and , is that I have been able to work with a large set of dependent variables (income, wealth, and deductions) having received access to results of the audits on all taxpayers 3 . The results are consistent with previous findings indicating that moral suasion has hardly any effect on tax compliance, despite an analysis of cooperation at the local level where moral suasion may be more effective. However, as Blumenthal et al. (2001) and Torgler (2004) In Switzerland, contrary to other countries, the citizens have the opportunity to actively participate in the legislative procedure. This advantage is also reflected in the tax legislation, which stipulates self-declaration by the taxpayers. This Swiss system presupposes that citizens have a sense of responsibility and are ready to maintain the functioning of municipalities, cantons, and the state. With your conscientious tax declaration you contribute to preserving this democratic and liberal structure.
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